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I would like to propose, from a social semiotic (cf. Lemke, 1990; 1995; 1996) or 
ecological perspective (Maturana & Varela, 1991; 1992), that intuition, tacit 
knowledge, and feelings may be signs of personal and social meaning-systems which, 
although generally below conscious awareness, may significantly affect a researcher's 
work processes and meaning-making. I will argue that investigating, analysing and 
reporting such signs in oneself and others should enhance the resolution of 
inconsistencies between meaning systems and practice. They may also play a 
significant role in processes involved in problem solving and creativity. I believe, 
therefore, that they have a legitimate place in both research and research reports.  
 
 
 "I believe that matters of meaning and matters of socialrelationship are so 
interdependent that we must understand bothto understand either." ( Jay Lemke, 1995)  
 
"La théorie, c'est bon, mais ça n'empêchepas d'exister." [`Theory is well and good, but 
this doesn'tkeep things from existing.'] (Advice to Freud by Charot, Frenchpsycho-
analyst. (Gay, 1988, cited in Blades, 1994 
  
 Although intuition and insight are generally admitted to play a significant part in 
achieving progress in research, they are not so easily admitted in the research report 
itself as a significant part of the reported methodology. Importantly, for my current 
purpose, the expectation of the purely cognitive in this form of reporting has largely 
set a convention for the absence of a-logical processes in reporting research in science 
education and indeed for science education itself. I believe that this is unfortunate and 
hope to show why.  
 
I am proposing in this paper that intuitions and emotions are signs of tacit knowledge 
of personal and social meaning-systems which, although generally below conscious 
awareness, are an integral part of one's practice and meaning-making. I would like to 
argue that the model of learning presented in many education research reports, a 
model which excludes intuition, and insight and any indication of the physiological 
processes accompanying them, gives readers, including novice researchers, little 
vicarious experience of processes which may be essential for achieving insight and 
understanding in any area, but particularly in a social science. I believe that a change 
in emphasis is needed in research reports so that a-logical processes get more 
recognition as part of achieving understanding and cognitive change in a social 
science field like science education research.  
 
I am assuming that research in education is ultimately about change with respect to 
teaching and learning, and I believe that there is considerable evidence that such a-
logical processes may be crucial for significant conceptual change. Hence, continuing 
to conceive of learning as being almost entirely cognitive may prevent the 
optimisation of the conditions necessary for significant change. My beliefs are 
supported in the research literature from a number of areas, including social learning 
(e.g., Bandura, 1965; Vygotsky, 1966/1991), conceptual change (see Hanrahan, 1994 
for a review of particular influences), and organisational change (especially Argyris & 
Schön, 1974, Dick, 1998; Robinson, 1993). However, in this paper, I am going to 
focus particularly on the literature on knowledge as the result of the adaptation 
process between an individual and his or her environment, backed up by the literature 
on insight. I also have considerable evidence from a case study of my own experience 
of informal writing during my PhD, but will only refer to this briefly, as it is the 
subject of another paper being presented at AARE 1998.  
 
In the view of learning which I have come to hold, what is generally called the 
cognitive part cannot be separated from tacit knowledge, including affective and 
physiological processes. If these are separated an impoverished theory of learning 
results which does not sufficiently explain why academic learning in schools and 
tertiary institutions is so often poorly transferred to the world outside school, and why 
research often does not seem to go far enough towards helping to solve educational 
problems (cf. Robinson, 1993).  
 
The two biosocial system theories which have been recent influences in my seeing 
things this way are Lemke's ecosocial system theory (Lemke, 1990, 1995) and 
Maturana and Varela's ecological system theory (Maturana, 1991, Maturana & 
Varela, 1992). These will be my main focus in this paper. However, part of the reason 
that such theories have appealed to me is because they are compatible with, but more 
comprehensive than most of the learning theories which have convinced me in the 
past, including social learning theories, conditioning theories, psychoanalytic theory, 
constructivism, language and literacy learning theories, humanistic, organisational, 
and counselling psychology theories, theories about problem solving, insight 
processes and expert learning, as well as theories about consciousness-raising and 
social change. They also tie in well with what I know about biochemistry, physiology 
and psychopathology.  
 
All these theories focus to some extent on learning as part of a person's history in their 
social and material environments, although they differ in the extent to which they see 
knowledge as social practice, and also in the extent to which they allow that learning 
may be a subconscious process. Both the biosocial system theories, however, assert 
strongly that knowledge is social practice, and that learning is not necessarily under 
conscious control, but agree that learning is an active interaction between an 
individual and his or her environment, with successful adaptation and change 
depending on such activity. In the following section, although I shall certainly not be 
able to do the biosocial system theories justice, I hope to provide enough detail to 
explain why I believe the definition of learning in research as elsewhere should 
embrace a-logical processes.  
 
 
Part I. Behaviour as Biological and Social Practice 
Even though social semiotic theories such as that of Lemke (1990, 1995) and 
biological theories such as that of Maturana and Varela (1992) have essential 
differences, for me they are complementary theories, with each expanding on 
something of what the other glosses over, to allow me to understand more fully the 
nature of learning and change, from both a social and an individual perspective, and 
how change has come about in my own knowledge during my PhD study. Lemke's 
theory of meaning-making concentrates on linguistic and social practice, while 
Maturana and Varela emphasise the biological basis of human understanding as it 
occurs in systems living in biological balance with each other. Both theories see 
knowledge as practice, practice which has been learnt/constructed over a lifetime, in 
interaction with the social and physical systems of which one's practice is a part. 
Knowledge depends on (and is limited by) the tools one has at one's disposal and 
these are determined by one's social and physical history (cf. Piaget, 1969/1991, 
Vygotsky 1966/1991).  
 
Lemke's Ecosocial System Theory (1990, 1995, 1996) 
Lemke is not concerned with explaining individual differences but with explaining the 
systematicity of the social practice of language and associated communication 
systems which result in learning. For him, "learning is essentially social" (Lemke, 
1990, p. 76), in the classroom and elsewhere. In his social semiotic system, 
knowledge is seen as emerging as part of particular situations of social practice, rather 
than as something which could somehow be detached from the contexts in which it 
occurs. According to Lemke (1990),  
 
Social semiotics includes formal semiotics [the systematic study of the systems of 
signs themselves] and goes on to ask how people use signs to construct the life of a 
community...trying to unite the study of human behavior, especially meaning-making 
behavior (talking, writing, reasoning, drawing, gesturing, etc.) with the study of 
society." (p. 183)  
 
Among important components of social semiotics he would also include learning 
from critical sociology, which "explains social processes without assuming the way 
they are is the way they have to be, or the way they ought to be" (p. 184), and aspects 
of ethnomethodology, and social constructivism.  
 
Building on Halliday's systemic functional grammar, Lemke explains language 
practice as having many semiotic functions simultaneously, all tied to some extent to 
features of the context (Halliday, 1994; Lemke, 1995). As well as having a function of 
communicating ideas (what Halliday, 1994, terms the ideational function and Lemke, 
1996, the presentational), interpersonal communication has features relating to the 
interpersonal function of the situation (e.g., the relationship and evaluative stances the 
actor takes towards the addressee and his or her own content respectively), and the 
textual function (including how the content is logically interrelated and how the 
structure of the whole is to be understood).  
 
Another part of Lemke's theory which is relevant for my purposes in this paper is his 
distinction between meaning-systems and interaction systems. "We always do more 
than we recognize that we do" (Lemke, 1990, p. 213). He wrote of "potential 
meaning" and "inarticulable interests", and distinguished between "social action 
analyzed as semiotic practice and as material process" (Lemke, 1990, p. 213). A 
meaning system is the knowledge a particular social group has about its practice as 
expressed consciously or subconsciously in its practice, including its cultural 
activities such as language and art. (As such it is similar to Gee's broad definition of a 
Discourse which Lankshear (1994, p. 6) explains as a particular "socially constructed 
and recognised [way] of doing and being in the world, which integrate[s] and 
regulate[s] ways of acting, thinking, feeling, using language, believing, and 
valuing.").  
 
An interaction system is a different way of accounting for the same material system 
which supports the meaning system(s). It contains all the material interactions that are 
taking place in situations whether or not they are accounted for by the meaning 
system(s) at that particular time, either because they have not been noticed, or because 
they have been thought irrelevant to the meaning of that situation. For example a 
choreographer's intentions in planning a dance sequence may be consistent with a 
known theory of dance but there may be other knowledge existing in the relationship 
between the dancers and the dance context which needs to be taken into account in 
practice. At first the extra elements may be seen by the wider dance community as 
accidental and unnecessary, if they are noticed at all, but it is conceivable that such 
elements could come to be seen to be essential to the functioning of the system and be 
incorporated into the meaning-system. A meaning system is thus the interaction 
system as a particular cultural group perceives it to be, plus their practice based on 
such perceptions, whereas the interaction system is what people actually do, given 
their meaning-system beliefs, as well as other factors of which they may have little 
awareness.  
 
Meaning systems and interaction systems are thus interdependent with each limiting 
the possibilities of the development of the other. This is similar to Maturana and 
Varela's explanation of knowledge as what we "bring forth together" but places less 
emphasis on the limits of the nervous system, which are not seen as necessary for a 
theory of social semiotics.  
 
The Biology of Human Understanding (Maturana and Varela, 1992)  
Maturana, a biologist who has specialised in studying nervous systems, and Varela, a 
neuroscientist and former student of Maturana's, together have developed a theory of 
human understanding from neurophysiological and wider biological phenomenology 
perspectives. Briefly they see all living organisms (from single-celled to the most 
complex) as having achieved internal autonomy (autopoiesis) at the same time as 
necessary effective coupling with other systems in their environment. Knowledge is 
seen as "effective action, that is, operating effectively in the domain of existence of 
living beings" (p. 29), and can be summed up in two aphorisms, "All doing is 
knowing and all knowing is doing" and "Everything said is said by someone" (p. 26).  
 
They argue against a representational view of knowledge as "information" which is 
held and used for action. Rather they see "animal and environment as two sides of the 
one coin" (p. 253), mutually dependent with neither being able to be defined 
effectively in isolation from the other. Knowledge is the result of both history and 
present circumstances.  
 
They have elaborated their theory of the biology of human understanding 
progressively, beginning with the origin of unicellular life on earth, and tracing it 
through the history of its development into multicellular organisms and thence to 
complex organisms with nervous systems to more complex systems which may have 
developed logical accounting, cognitive acts, social and cultural phenomena, language 
and reflective consciousness, and finally reflexivity and ethics.  
 
Knowledge in humans, therefore, is not restricted to conscious cognitive activity, but 
represents the sum total of their recurrent behaviour in relation to their environment, 
whether they are conscious of it or not. Moreover, there is no way that they can know 
outside of their interactions with their environment, and "what counts as relevant" (p. 
253) in this relationship is predetermined by the limits of their senses and history. In 
fact the world that they "know" is really a world which they "bring forth" ("bringing 
forth is the burning issue of knowledge" (p. 27). Because understanding the dynamics 
of a system requires adopting a certain distance from it, this is difficult for living 
beings as "their genesis and their history are never directly visible and can be 
reconstructed only by fragments" (p. 58).  
 
Understanding the part played by components in a system involves understanding that 
no environmental or even internal factor is ever a "cause" of change in the organism; 
the most it can be is a trigger for a chain of events whose outcome will depend on 
structure and functioning of the system which itself will depend to some extent on the 
presence of other elements in the organism's environment. In this way, even genes 
cannot be seen as "stored information".  
 
Knowledge as Both Systemic and Individual 
So sum up the differences between these theories, for Lemke (1995) the emphasis is 
on the part played by one's cultural system in determining language (and hence 
thinking) practices, with the part being played by the individual being down-played to 
counteract a popular belief that an individual is largely responsible for and in control 
of his or her own thinking. For Maturana and Varela (1992) the emphasis is on the co-
determination of practice by an organism and its environment as they co-adapt, and 
the way this is allowed for or limited by that organism's history and structural 
dynamics (its ontogenic and phylogenic adaptations to its environment). As such the 
latter theory allows a greater emphasis on the individual (organism) and the way its 
knowledge is limited by its biological structure (particularly its nervous structure) as 
well as its history. That is, an individual's behaviour is seen as the result of the history 
of interactions between that particular organism and its environment but, as in 
Lemke's theory, an individual is not seen as acting independently of the social system 
to which he or she belongs, nor is behaviour seen as having meaning outside the 
system to which it belongs.  
 
There are many implications of such theories for any theory of change and any 
attempts to produce change in practice, whether in teaching and learning, in 
curriculum development, or organisational development at the systemic level. Either 
way, research itself is implicated, whether its goal be to produce knowledge or to 
produce change. These biosocial system theories have helped explain for me the 
phenomena of intuition, tacit learning and insight and the important place these may 
have in learning through research. Since knowledge as practised goes far beyond or 
even differs from what we have made explicit in our theories, it may sometimes only 
be grasped intuitively and insight may be longer in coming. Yet these may have an 
important place in research as in other learning.  
 
The notion of knowledge as practice makes possible recognition of knowledge used 
outside conscious awareness, knowledge which is not necessarily part of logical 
processes. Once it is allowed that logical means are not the only means of acquiring 
new knowledge, then we can begin to look more openly at other processes involved in 
learning and change and see that they go far beyond analytic thinking.  
 
Part II. Defining Tacit Knowledge, Intuition and Insight  
Tacit Knowledge 
Given the above biosocial system theories, and also my reading of Polanyi (1962, 
1963/1983), I would define tacit knowledge as knowledge which is available and 
which may be used, but which is outside conscious awareness or control1. Polanyi 
(1993/1983, p. 40) wrote, "we can know more than we can tell". Some components of 
such knowledge are almost entirely outside conscious control but could be brought to 
awareness to some extent if required. These include (a) prior knowledge which has 
become automatic, for example, ways of perceiving and ways of interrelating 
interpersonally, which will include both ordinary and technical language use as well 
as non-verbal behaviour, (b) assumptions about what is or is not of particular value 
for problem solving in the area, (c) generalised beliefs about oneself and one's 
capabilities, and also about how others are likely to behave.  
 
Other components of tacit knowledge may enter awareness in an incomplete form 
such as (a) compelling intuitions, and (b) dissonant emotional or other behavioural 
reactions. Given the assumptions of biosocial system theories above, it will, I hope, 
become clearer why I see these as part of tacit knowledge when I go on to examine 
some of the literature on insight processes. Rather than seeing these as irrelevant to 
thinking processes, I believe that giving such experiences explicit recognition should 
increase the possibility that the tacit knowledge which lies behind them will be 
brought to conscious awareness and examined for both its accuracy and its 
appropriateness to a particular situation.  
 
For theoretical knowledge within a particular domain, this tacit component may not 
be very obvious, with most attention going to conscious processing. For practical 
knowledge, on the other hand, where a person must adapt to and interact with both 
their physical and social environments, more of their knowledge is likely to be held at 




Insight is sometimes used as a synonym for significant learning, especially when 
summing up experience over a considerably period of learning or over several 
situations (e.g., Pressley, 1985; Raymond, Butt, & Townsend, 1992; White, 1993). As 
such, it can mean the first successful attempts to make knowledge conscious in terms 
of the meaning systems available to one.  
 
At other times, especially in the context of a discussion about creativity (see 
particularly Poincaré, 1913) it is used in the singular (`an insight') to mean "seeing 
and understanding the inner nature of things clearly, especially by intuition" 
(Webster's New World Dictionary, as cited in Seifert, Meyer, Davidson, Patalano and 
Yaniv, 1995). As such it would seem to simplify and explain a collection of data 
which was previously seen as somewhat unconnected, nebulous or inexplicable. 
Poincaré stressed that an important aspect of such creativity is period of intermission 
from conscious work on a problem, thus implying that three stages are involved: a 
period of exhaustive work on the problem, a complete break from it, and then a 
"sudden illumination". He saw that the insight arrived with "brevity, suddenness and 
immediate certainty", which he was convinced, at least in the case of mathematical 
invention, was incontestably a "manifest sign of long-unconscious work" (Sacks, 
1998, p. 13). Sacks agreed that it is a kind of illumination characterised by 
"suddenness, clarity and immediate certainty", after a long period of unconscious 
work, of incubation in what Galton called the "antechamber of consciousness". He 
associated it with playfulness and contrasted it with analytical thought, asserting that 
it had to do with perception which is necessarily an unconscious process.  
 
Seifert et al. (1995) agree with the characterisation of insight as a three-stage process, 
with the final stage involving perception, but question the notion of "unconscious 
work", preferring to see that most of the analytical work has been done, like a jigsaw 
with only one or more missing pieces being needed to reach a new gestalt of the 
whole, with fortuitous associations providing the occasion for opportunistic 
assimilation.  
 
Giving such importance to associative processes is supported by another theorist 
concerned with the apparent restlessness of the mind. Lear (1988) posits that an 
important property of the mind is the making of associations which, although random, 
can be recruited for one's purposes. This may begin to explain the phenomenon of 
insight, especially if we agree that another characteristic of human beings is to want to 
solve problems and puzzles and to have rational explanations for all experienced 
phenomena. Sacks (1998) also noted the importance of the latter reflective processes, 
noting that for genuine creativity, although it can capitalise on "instant powers of 
improvisation and invention and imitation" (which can be found in those who have 
Tourette's syndrome or autism), there is also a necessity to go deeper into the 
unconscious, including into the "depths of the personality" (p. 5) (cf. his comment, p. 
8, that recollection involves "effort and responsibility", p. 8), and this requires a "level 
of mind" which may be absent, at least to a considerable extent, in those with autism, 
or those who have suffered brain damage. The "antechamber" or the "back of the 
mind" phenomena seems to suggest that when we are motivated to solve unsolved 
problems or to resolve cognitive conflict, then cues for such problems are held within 
reach, just outside consciousness but easily available for associative thinking.  
 
The Importance of Feelings in the Process of Insight 
Feelings are cited as being an important part of the insight process (Gick & Lockhart, 
1985; Gruber, 1995; Poincaré, 1913; Seifert et al., 1995), and similarly for less 
complete scientific intuitions (Fensham & Marton, 1992). Gruber, in presenting his 
evolving systems approach to insight, asserted that a stream of affect was part of the 
process, along with a stream of thought and a stream of purpose, all three streams 
continually interacting over the period of time leading up to an insight.  
 
Seifert et al. (1995), largely agreeing with Poincaré about the three-stage process, 
even while they disagree with the notion of prolonged unconscious work, also 
propose that the emotions are crucial for the entire length of the process of insight. 
Firstly, there is the preparation stage wherein an impasse is reached in a problem-
solving venture in spite of one's having tried every avenue possible. At the emotional 
level, one needs to be motivated to solve a problem and thoroughly explore all the 
data available, and to feel frustrated at failure to do so, to the extent that failure 
indices are set down in long term memory that they may easily be triggered by 
fortuitous associations. The second stage is a long incubation stage in which there is 
stimulation from external (or occasionally internal, as in the case of dreams) events 
during which there must be ongoing motivation (albeit in the absence of conscious 
intention and effort), to get beyond the impasse.  
 
The third stage is the illumination stage in which, stimulated by the appropriate cue, 
there is interpretation and assimilation (or accommodation) of the new data with 
comprehension of a new representation. This is accompanied by the `Aha!' sensation, 
where pleasure is strongly felt, which Seifert et al. suggested may be important for 
reinforcing such a process of learning. (Gick & Lockhart, 1995, note that chagrin at 
failing to perceive what later seems obvious may also be experienced). Seifert et al. 
also point out that the accompanying physiological arousal (increased heart rate, 
blood pressure, breathing and neural activity) may make it more likely that one will 
focus all one's attention on the solution, just as a high level of frustration facilitated 
the first stage. However, if the emotional level becomes too high, this could be 
dysfunctional. Seifert et al. found that a feeling of being overburdened with unsolved 




Contrary to the way emotional involvement has been seen by some in the past as 
being either irrelevant or a hindrance to the objectivity supposed to be important for 
critical thinking, such theories suggest that the emotions may be crucial to learning 
especially when significant conceptual change is sought. As Lave (in press, cited in 
Collins, Brown & Newman, 1989) found in her study of apprenticeship, emotional 
involvement and intrinsic motivation were integral to the development of the desired 
task. Tasks which were seen as meaningful and valued in the cultural community in 
which they were learnt, were seen as achievable by all, which, as Collins, Brown and 
Newman point out, is in contrast to school learning, where it is more likely to be 
accepted that native ability is a constraining factor.  
 
Intuition 
Intuition is a term which is often used interchangeable with insight as defined above, 
but with more emphasis on the incompleteness of the insight. Seifert et al. (1995), 
using the most often cited illustrations of creativity from Poincaré, illustrate the fact 
that he still had several hours of work to do to verify and demonstrate the results of 
his "satisfying resolution to the original problematic situation" (p. 75). Intuition is 
probably reserved for situations in which, although there is insight into a new way of 
perceiving the original problem, the verification phase is likely to be considerably 
longer, and success is not guaranteed. Intuition is seen as a belief that something has 
coherence, is the right way to act, or is meaningful, in spite of the fact that one cannot 
articulate one's reasoning fully at the time one has the intuition. Fensham and Marton 
(1992, citing Bruner 1965) explain intuition in terms of implicit knowledge that 
operates at a holistic level:  
 
Bruner set out to describe the nature of intuition by contrasting it with the 
characteristic feature of analytic thinking of proceeding a step at a time. Intuitive 
thinking, on the contrary, does not advance in that way. It `tends to involve 
manoeuvres that seem to be based on an implicit perception of the total problem'. He 
further suggests that the immediate apprehension associated with intuition contrasts 
with the `mediated' cognition that follows formal methods of analysis and proof. (p. 
115)  
 
Because intuitions consist partly of unexamined tacit knowledge, such intuitions need 
to be held in question until one is able to articulate them more fully and hence 
examine them for their consistency and appropriateness. They have been found to be 
an important feature of the way scientists work (e.g., Clement, 1991, Fensham & 
Marton, 1992; Tweney, 1991). Hence, as with the insight process, neglecting to 
acknowledge and report the place of intuition in research may lead to a belief that 
learning in research is principally about being analytical and logical and to ignore the 
very intuitions and feelings which may be vital for change in one's conceptual 
frameworks/insight.  
 
Other A-logical Processes 
Studies of traditional apprenticeship, such as that of Lave (in press, cited in Collins, 
Brown & Newman, 1989) suggest that holistic processes such as observation, and the 
learning of global before local skills, play a surprisingly key role in learning in such 
settings. Lave hypothesised that these processes seem to allow for the development of 
a conceptual model which provides an advance organiser or an interpretive structure 
for the earlier stages of learning and an internalised guide facilitating reflection for 
later, more autonomous learning. Hence tacit learning is seen to be tied up with 
conceptual development.  
 
Similarly, Nonaka (1991) hypothesised that successful "knowledge-constructing 
companies" in Japan were more likely to solve problems in holistic ways by "tapping 
the tacit and often highly subjective insights, intuitions, and hunches of individual 
employees and making those insights available for testing and use by the company as 
a whole" (p. 97), by "expressing the inexpressible" in figurative language which could 
embody both the vision to be developed and the collective sense of identity of the 
organisation, uniting the ideals at the top with the practical realities at the bottom of 
the organisation. Nonaka summed this up by saying that effective learning in the 
organisation was more about ideals than ideas, and about the creative use of tacit 
knowledge and human resources, in contrast to Western industrial thinking which 
seemed to prefer machine-like information processing methods of problem-solving.  
 
The above review of the literature on tacit knowledge and insight gives further 
evidence of the importance of intuitive and even subconscious knowledge in problem 
solving, as well as of the important role played by the emotions. This would seem to 
support biosocial theories of learning which define knowledge as practice which may 
sometimes be outside awareness and which very often does not seem to be controlled 
by conscious logical processes. If we are to accept such evidence that a-logical 
processes play a significant role in conceptual change and insight, then we must also 
face the implications of this for classroom teaching and learning, and, as I want to 
stress in this paper, for research, both in the doing and reporting stages. As 
Walkerdine (1994) said for subjectivity, if it is unavoidable, then it needs to be 
consciously addressed as part of the research process.  
 
 
Part III. Discussion 
Since I wrote the above two sections, I have written the expected scholarly section on 
the implications arising from a synthesis of the literature on ecological theories of 
learning and the theories on tacit learning. [Link here for those who think they would 
prefer to read the alternative conclusion to the paper .] I wrote it with a certain 
misgiving, however, and became increasingly dissatisfied the further I went with it. 
This was so, even though I found it validating more than I could have imagined, both 
the kind of critical collaborative research practices to which I was already committed, 
and a strong focus on personal knowledge and research relationships during research 
and when writing about it. My misgiving arose because taking such a course would 
have seemed to imply that successful communication was merely a matter of leading 
or being lead via a set of reasonable premises to a logical conclusion. This assumption 
seemed to fly in the face of the position I have been trying to present in this paper: 
that the kind of learning which could affect anyone's practice is a much more personal 
process.  
 
So I'm not even going to try to systematically convince you that my theories lead 
naturally and logically to conclusions that conceptual change of the kind expected of 
students or of teachers in classrooms and of researchers in research studies needs to 
involve social change within ecosocial systems. In any case, it is gradually dawning 
on me that this would be superfluous, given that many of you (especially 
ethnographers, critical action researchers, action scientists, social constructivists, post-
structuralists, cognitive scientists, and socio-semiotic linguists) understood this 
already many years, even decades ago, and have been trying to convince people like 
me ever since.  
 
Nor will I try to lead you to the logical conclusion that personal knowledge, intuition, 
and, just as importantly, emotional involvement, are integral parts of the way we 
know since they have resulted from the fact that each of us is a living organism in 
biological balance with a larger biosocial system. Again, it would be superfluous 
because, even though this is a recent discovery for me, many of you have been saying 
this for years, admittedly a different group from the first, though there may be 
considerable overlap, since it seems more typical of feminist researchers, humanist 
and cognitive behavioural psychologists, whole language theorists, adult learning 
theorists, psychotherapists and psychoanalysts, and some cognitive psychologists, 
especially those dealing with insight, motivation or information processing.  
 
Similarly, although I am tempted to, I won't develop the idea that research reports 
should represent and model the range of types of thinking and feeling which go into 
learning, both to be consistent with their own learning theories, and to illustrate to 
teachers and prospective researchers that learning and conceptual development should 
not be conceived of simply as step-by-step logical processes, especially when 
conceptual and perceptual leaps are required. Nor will I lead conventional dissertation 
supervisors/committees step-by-step towards a conclusion that there are richer ways 
of learning, knowing, creating and communicating knowledge than the impersonal, 
systematic ones they seem to most encourage; nor thesis examiners towards a 
conclusion that these more personal ways should be revealed in theses, and used 
creatively for more effective and engaging communication of the insights reached 
during the research.  
 
What I will do, instead, is to try to give some idea of what this all means for me in my 
life, and of why it has consumed all my time and energy for the past few weeks--
though it must be admitted that it has also generated this same energy, as well as 
much delight, and even, at times, joy. Nevertheless for those most comfortable with 
their commitment to unproblematic epistemological beliefs and the security of 
traditional conventions for research and academic writing, I feel I owe some 
explanation.  
 
My original goal in writing this paper was to justify, at least to myself, my own way 
of going about learning from (and in) my research. Right throughout my PhD, I have 
been writing a reflective journal, and I have become convinced that all the significant 
learning during my PhD took place in this journal. And yet, I have found that I have 
tended to keep it as a somewhat shameful secret, only bursting out with it when I had 
a new audience whom I thought might give me a new hearing. I continued to explain 
my main methodology for my research as regular systematic processes of quantitative 
analysis, grounded theory analysis, interpretive research, text analysis and action 
research, without giving too much away about the unsystematic processes which lay, 
in my case, beyond the hypotheses and conclusions provided in these studies.  
 
It was my guilty secret that my journals consisted mainly of what some would no 
doubt refer to scathingly as "stream of consciousness" writing. Even thought I agree 
that there was little conscious effort at systematic analysis, I myself did not find that 
my thoughts streamed from my brain directly on to the computer screen through my 
fingers. I had to stop and choose the words to express what was as yet inchoate, and 
was usually surprised at what ended up in the typed document, as it was usually 
something of which I was not aware previously. In fact, although I did also use my 
journal regularly to recall where I had been and to recount what I had been doing and 
what I had observed, especially when I was doing field research, my most urgent need 
to write in my journal came when I felt confused or blocked.  
 
Often this involved feelings of depression, guilt, shame, or hopelessness and these 
might be associated with relationships with others involved in my PhD research, or 
with past experiences which somehow connected up with my research. This would 
lead to much soul-searching, some reflecting about earlier periods of my life which 
had remained unexamined until then, and some (self) talk therapy in which I 
interrogated myself on my irrational behaviour, trying to lead myself back to a 
reasonable position--which probably meant one in which feelings weren't involved. 
Sometimes it took several sessions but almost invariably I would achieve some new 
insight into whatever was troubling me, and new ways ahead would seem to open up, 
and new reserves of energy and enthusiasm to appear.  
 
For much of my PhD, I saw such writing as an indulgence, something which was not 
a legitimate form of research work, but something which I had to do because I had 
this particular disability of having feelings which "interfered" with my thinking, 
which, it seemed to me, normal people did not experience (it should be remembered 
that my context is science education); apparently other people were easily able to 
separate thinking and feeling, and dismiss feelings as irrelevant.  
 
I also did much reflecting on my reading in the research literature in my journals and 
found endless connections between what I found there and my own mental 
meanderings which helped me considerably to clarify my thinking. I tended to let 
myself free-associate as I went along, not rejecting any ideas as irrelevant, so long as 
they enlightened the train of thought I was currently engaged in. Another source of 
associations was what I have called memos. There were generally hand-written notes 
made while I was reading or writing to remind myself to follow up some idea which 
might have some relevance to my own work. I entered all of these diligently into my 
journal, even though I often had little idea where they might fit. I was just acting on 
an intuition that they belonged in the larger picture I was trying to construct and that 
their place would become clear in time, which it often did. The more writing I did the 
more all these different pieces would connect up, until insights into new ways of 
framing my work would happen.  
 
I said I originally saw my reflective writing, especially the part dealing with my 
feelings and relationships, as an indulgence. More recently, I have had to recognise 
the importance of this writing methodology, as my theories continued to develop in 
the absence of any visible systematic approach. I realised then that I was going to 
have to "own up to" it in my thesis. At first, I could not imagine how, when I stood up 
for my PhD oral examination, I would be able to justify this jumble of personal 
intuitions, therapy sessions, mental meandering, poems, story-telling, first drafts of 
personal letters, hypothesising, brain-storming, and soul-searching, and how I would 
justify why I used it in preference to supposedly more reliable and rigorous systematic 
analytic approaches. `I used it because it seems to work', I would most likely mumble 
defensively. That might work: I had, after all, had four papers accepted for publication 
in international journals of some standing, not to mention one local publication. But I 
somehow suspected that more would be required of me.  
 
It was then that I decided that I would have to analyse my personal writing 
systematically to find out what I was doing exactly and, if possible, why it did work. 
When I did this, I discovered some surprising facts. Firstly, the negative feelings were 
intimately connected to my thinking and learning--they weren't irrelevant detours. The 
process of dealing with them was also a process of unearthing the subterranean 
assumptions and beliefs that underlay them, and then analysing these rigorously using 
all the evidence I could muster from any other area of my knowledge. By the time I 
had finished dealing with them, my thinking would have changed irreversibly, and 
this would have repercussions for my research, opening up new possibilities, and 
closing down others which were now clearly no longer viable.  
 
In fact, it became clear to me that my feelings were clues to problems in my thinking 
or in my situation, and that rather than being irrelevant distracters which must be 
removed, they were useful signposts to hidden knowledge or hidden problems. If I 
hadn't paid attention to them, or had simply sedated myself, I wouldn't have made the 
progress which then became possible. My former disability had been transformed into 
a gift!  
 
Another thing which became abundantly clear was that without the more playful part 
of my journal writing--the collecting, turning over in my mind, and combining of 
associations, of fanciful hypotheses, of attempts at marrying ideas from different 
discourses, and of incomplete ideas--I would not have experienced the coming 
together of these into new insights. Although logical accounting was part of the 
processes resulting in learning, it was only part of the groundwork. For real advances 
in my conceptual frameworks, all the parts had to be there and there had to be 
something which helped trigger the new gestalt which appeared to coalesce out of the 
parts, without conscious reasoning and as an instant act of perception.  
 
What had seemed a preposterous thought--that a consciously rational step-by-step 
approach was not as good for deep learning as a less organised, a-logical but 
personally and socially meaningful approach--now came to seem an indisputable fact, 
at least in my own case. A technical approach was certainly useful when one had all 
the facts and simply needed to compute them to reach a conclusion, but, as Polanyi 
(1962) had pointed out, that was an essentially mindless activity in any case. 
Anything which required one to "change" one's mind seemed to require so much 
more. As I found in the literature, there was much evidence to support this: including 
of course the literature I have cited relating to biosocial systems, the literature on 
conceptual change in science and other school subjects, much of the literature on 
perception and cognition, and the various literatures on language and literacy 
learning, adult learning, psychopathology, insight and creativity; and, on research 
itself, the literature I was familiar with on critical action research, on teacher change, 
on organisational change and development, and on social movements.  
 
It remains to be seen whether this attempt to connect with you personally has worked 
or not. I am hoping that it has enabled you to engage more deeply with the 
implications of the theories I have presented in this paper. I realise, however, that I 
need to remain open to the possibility that the more logical approach I have taken in 
the alternative version will be preferred and will affect you more powerfully, in which 





To give me feedback, email me at mailto:%20m.hanrahan@qut.edu.au.  




Note 1. I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Peter Fensham in helping in the 
process of "bringing forth" the theory presented in this paper, from supporting me in 
its early stages in 1996 when it was little more than a bunch of intuitions, to 
suggesting the readings which were instrumental in my seeing that it could be 
justified theoretically, to giving feedback to parts of earlier drafts of this paper.  
 
Another very important part of the process, especially for refining and clarifying my 
understanding of tacit knowledge was ongoing email dialogue with Bob Dick, the 
moderator of the <Tacit-l@scu.edu.au> email list, who also helped me to appreciate 
the part played by subconscious knowledge in practice and the importance of 
addressing this in action research. Paul Wildman also assisted in this process.  
 
Jay Lemke assisted me in my initial struggles to come to terms with an ecosocial 
system approach to learning, and then later with suggestions for further reading, and 
with constructive feedback on an earlier draft. Jan Wilson first put me on to some of 
the literature on insight which I have found most useful for clarifying my thinking in 
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[Alternative Development and Conclusion] 
Link back to first conclusion to paper.  
 
At the beginning of his inaugural lecture at the opening of the Centre for the Mind at 
the Australian National University earlier this year, Oliver Sacks commented,  
 
"A great fuss is made about consciousness, as if consciousness is the top. I think that 
the top is creativity, and I will be saying that I think creativity involves the depth of a 
mind, and many, many depths of unconsciousness." Polanyi (1992, p. vii) went 
further in questioning the relative importance of so-called objective processes of 
thinking:  
 
"Our theory of knowledge is now seen to imply an ontology of the mind. Objectivism 
requires a specifiably mindless knower. To accept the indeterminacy of knowledge 
requires, on the contrary, that we accredit a person entitled to shape his knowing 
according to his own judgment, unspecifiably."  
 
In this paper, I have brought together many perspectives, all pointing to the 
conclusion that, contrary to the popular belief in the superiority of "objective" 
cognitive processes, intuitive processes are integral to conceptual change and to 
change in social practice. A significant component of such learning would seem to be 
emotional experiences, both to facilitate culturally valued practice, and to cue and 
reward the taking of appropriate action for successful problem solving.  
 
There are many implications of such conclusions for a wide range of areas in which 
learning and change are involved, but I will only have the space here to focus on a 
few important implications for research and researchers in education, for example, for 
research intended to lead to change in school systems, for the choice of the best 
research methods for exploring theories of teaching and learning in mini-communities 
such as classrooms which exist in balance with larger social systems such as schools 
and education systems. There are also implications for the communication and 
dissemination of research if this is to facilitate further effective research and change.  
 
The Difficulty of Achieving Change in Stable Systems 
If, as Robinson (1993), claimed, the problems to be encountered in the social science 
of educational research are complex, ill-structured ones, then addressing such 
problems will require much more than technical reasoning. It will require researchers 
to seek ways of accessing the tacit personal knowledge underlying current beliefs and 
practice, in relation to both research contexts and research processes. Not until tacit 
knowledge is brought to awareness can there be any questioning of its taken-for-
granted nature or any appreciation of gaps between practice and meaning-systems. 
The same intuitive processes of perception and feelings which are involved in insight, 
can be put to use in research,  
 
Problem solving involving stakeholders with different views has been shown to 
benefit from surfacing, articulating, and addressing differences between the tacit 
assumptions of different stakeholders (Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Dick, 1998; Erickson & 
Christman, 1994), and the differences between a person's explicit theories or 
"espoused theories" and the same person's tacit theories or "theories-in-action 
(Argyris & Schön, 1974; Dick, 1998; Whitehead, 1993.  
 
Lemke (1995) in explaining the need for praxis in practice, argued that only a system 
which was open to discovering and responding to such disjunctions between its 
meaning system and the interaction system would be able to respond to changes in its 
environment in ways which would allow it to continue to survive--something he was 
not convinced our own civilisation, so self-regulated in its meaning systems, was 
particularly successful at doing, a doubt also expressed by Harding when referring to 
traditional approaches to research (1998). However, he cautioned that achieving 
change in a meaning system was likely to be very difficult and suggested that a new 
theory was only likely to prosper when it filled a gap in an existing meaning-system, 
rather than when it suggested a new arrangement. Other research theorists have been 
more optimistic, particularly those engaged in collaborative action research, where 
theory is developed as practitioners do research while they are actively practising, in 
repeated cycles of responsive action and critical reflection.  
 
Collaborative Action Research 
Since the tacit knowledge such as interrelated beliefs about language and 
epistemology, interpersonal relationships and communication, and about what is to be 
valued and what is not, is, by definition, largely outside conscious control and is 
invisible to the practitioners using it, it needs first to be surfaced and investigated, and 
this requires the use of appropriate methods (Argyris and Schön, 1974; Erickson & 
Christman, 1996).  
 
One family of research methodologies which has been widely recognized as having 
this capacity is action research, with its well-known cycles of planning, acting and 
observing, and reflecting. This is particularly likely to be the case when it combines 
such methods as ethnography, group discussion, and individual reflection, in a 
reflexive and responsive manner. The fact that an unreflective self-regulated system 
fails to adapt in a rational and just manner to changes or needs in its environment has 
long been recognized in the literature about action research based on critical theory 
(e.g., Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Fals Borda, 1979/1988; Kemmis & McTaggart, 1988) 
and action science (Argyris, 1983; Argyris & Schön, 1974). Given the need for 
keeping systems open to change, critical reflection on practice, both on the part of 
individuals and collectives is necessary for interrupting such over-regulation.  
 
However, action research can be more or less collaborative, or even an individual 
enterprise. An ecosocial system approach to change in practice at any level of an 
education system would seem to call for a collaborative approach, since any 
individual effort at change is likely to be resisted by the inertia of the system with its 
practices which have co-evolved to fit in with each other. The more research is 
collaborative, however, the more tacit knowledge differences between the different 
stakeholders will need to be surfaced and articulated for the collaborative decision-
making processes necessary for local commitment to change processes (Erickson & 
Christman, 1994). Methods such as ethnography and effective methods of individual 
and collective reflection would seem indicated.  
 
Ethnography has been found to be practical and useful for observing and interpreting 
the tacit features of the culture of the research context. Moreover, Erickson and 
Christman (1994) wrote that an ethnographic approach provided a safe environment 
for collaborative research because it assumed that "differences in perspective are 
normal within a social group", and that all participants were "active and making 
sense" (p. 151).  
 
Group processes of decision-making. Such ethnographies may then be used as the 
observation phase of an action research cycle, providing evidence which is used in 
subsequent collective discussion, where the different participants can act as critical 
friends for each other as they collectively reflect and plan (e.g., Atweh, Kemmis & 
Weeks, 1998; Erickson & Christman, 1986; Kemmis & McTaggart, 1988). Such 
group processes are usually supported by individual reflective writing which is also 
believed to enhance the process and is usually encouraged as an additional source of 
data and insight to support group discussion (e.g., Beasley, 1983; Kemmis & 
McTaggart, 1988).  
 
Individual reflective writing. Not only is tacit knowledge important in research in that 
it is an integral part of the practice in the context being researched, but it is an 
important part of the researcher's own practice. If action research is to be true to its 
praxis approach, it must not only be critical of what has become taken for granted in 
the systems it is researching, it must also be critical of its own taken-for-granted 
processes. Not surprisingly, then, some schools of action research make reflexive 
practice by individual researchers the main focus (e.g., McNiff, Whitehead, Laidlaw, 
& Members of the Bath Action Research Group, 1992; Newman, 1997; Schön, 1983). 
However, this is most often in the context of research on some practice other than 
research itself.  
 
The importance of such reflection for improving practice within the professions, and 
particularly in teaching has often been recognised (e.g., Baird, Fensham, Gunstone, & 
White, 1991; Grimmett & Erickson, 1988; Loughran, 1996; Ryan & Somekh, 1991; 
Schön, 1983; Schön, 1991; Weeks, 1994) but the notion of academic social science 
research as a type of professional practice requiring self-critical reflection is less often 
recognised (Noffke, 1998), perhaps because such research has its own formal 
methodologies and methods, which have their own inbuilt safeguards for achieving 
rigour.  
 
A positivistic position has been largely discredited in social science research (e.g., 
Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Erickson, 1986; Guba & Lincoln, 1989) but perhaps it has left 
its residue in an attitude that research is a matter of using prescribed methods on 
clear-cut questions (cf. Robinson, 1993). Such an attitude that research is a straight-
forward analytical process would require researchers to place accepted formal 
methods in the foreground of research reports, and informal personal reflection and 
processes used to achieve insight, even where it has been most productive and 
creative, in the background. Hence critical reflection and creative processes which go 
beyond analysis in terms of a particular methodology may be undervalued or even 




Harnessing Intuitive Processes 
As asserted above in Part II, one of the creative and apparently a-logical processes 
which has implications for research is the natural tendencies of human beings to make 
random associations, and to use them opportunistically in problem solving and insight 
processes. Insights in research as elsewhere can be explained by allowing that an 
individual learns partly by using such processes which are beyond conscious control 
and whose result may only become conscious once a new level of organisation of 
previously disconnected data is reached. Rather than being a trivial and irrelevant 
characteristic of human (and other living) beings, biosocial theories and insight 
theories (see also Lear, 1998) seem to suggest that the tendency to make associations 
is more likely to be an integral part of the survival process which has evolved in 
response to a history of interactions between a species and its environment, a way to 
prevent systems from becoming rigid and unresponsive to environmental changes.  
 
If learning in research is seen as involving insight processes, then, given the evidence 
from the literature cited in this paper, one might expect it to recruit intuitive and 
associative thinking and to capitalise on feelings which help one to take advantage of 
such useful associations. The emotions can then be seen as significant ways in which 
intuitive interpretations present rather than as a source of distraction to be ignored or 
repressed (cf. Mandler, 1975). Creative use of such intuitive processes is a feature of 
many forms of research, where it can be found in either or both of the investigation 
and representation stages.  
 
Such methodologies include phenomenological research (van Manen, 1990), narrative 
inquiry and other personal experience methods (Clandinin & Connelly, 1994), 
fictional-critical writing (Winter, 1988), artistic methods (Eisner, 1997), and, of 
course, a great deal of feminist writing (e.g., Ellis, Kiesinger & Tillmann-Healy, 
1997; Erickson, 1997; Haug, 1992; Harding, 1997; Lather, 1991, 1996; Olesen, 1994; 
Richardson, 1994; Walkerdine, 1994). However, in mainstream research such as that 
found in science education, admitting to such sources of insight is generally seen as 
much less acceptable and a great need is still seen to argue the case for it in public 
forums (e.g., Eisner, 1997; Erickson, 1996; Harding, 1997; Walkerdine, 1994). Yet, if 
intuitive processes are essential for good research, it would seem dishonest to 
continue to preserve the myth that research is an objective process requiring only 
impersonal, logical processes. Counteracting this myth, however, would require more 
widespread changes in both the content and the style of research writing. The personal 
would need to be re-admitted and the need for an impersonal and supposedly 
objective style of writing reassessed.  
 
If the personal--what is particular about an individual--is a part of the system which 
produces knowledge/practice, and hence is necessary for a full understanding of that 
knowledge, then the personal body (as experienced by oneself and others), and not 
just one's cognitive faculties, become the instrument of research. Hence 
acknowledgement of the tacit data this implies should appear in the methodology or 
other relevant section in as far as it is relevant to the research process and can be 
ascertained or at least guessed at. For similar reasons relationships are crucially 
important in social science research and their part in the meaning-making should be 
taken into account. Educational research is a social practice, and as such it involves 
interpersonal relationships in an important way (Grundy, 1996; Noffke, 1994), and 
these too involve tacit knowledge.  
 
How Research is Represented in Research Writing 
Another reason for changing expectations about the way research is should be 
reported has to do with communication. A scientific approach to writing about 
research is usually restricted to a concern with the ideational and allows the 
interpersonal and textual functions to be fixed by convention. This precludes writing 
about personal aspects of research in a way which critiques one's own position as 
being inside the practice of the context. It also precludes taking a critical stance 
towards the philosophical assumptions underlying one's research.  
 
I see the conventions of writing impersonally as a major disadvantage in social 
science research where a researcher is inevitably in a complex social relationship with 
the other participants while doing the research, and where I believe any significant 
change in any part of the system will affect all other parts of the system to a greater or 
lesser degree, and hence will necessitate some reflection on value assumptions by all 
participants, including the researcher, as part of the meaning-making process.  
 
Revealing personal contextual factors and relationship variables with co-researchers 
and with readership has another advantage for research reports. I believe it is more 
likely to lead to useful engagement with the text and subsequent productive dialogue 
than an impersonal approach which tends to distance the reader (cf. Lemke, 1990). 
Some may object that "personalising the issues can make it harder to discuss ideas 
and arguments" (KS, personal email communication, 17/8/'98). However, quite apart 
from the fact that I can no longer agree that personal factors should be kept out on the 
grounds that they are just distracters, I subscribe to the theories of those (e.g., Blades, 
1994; Bruner, 1990; Strube, 1995) who believe that narrative is the way that human 
beings tend to make meaning most naturally and easily. This is, of course, compatible 
with meaning-making as making sense within the historical practice of one's 
community or communities.  
 
Another point of presentation has to do with the level of figurative language to be 
used. If learning has as much to do with grasping new perspectives as to do with 
logical processes, then it makes sense to communicate research findings in a way 
which can capture the kind of content to be communicated. As van Manen,(1990) has 
written, "The experience of something that appears ineffable within the context of one 
type of discourse may be expressible by means of another form of discourse" (p. 113). 
For example, Blades (1994) used allegory and metaphor in his dissertation to 
communicate the post-modern nature of the problem he was investigating (an attempt 
at curriculum change in a particular science education system), since he did not 
believe it could be communicated as powerfully in customary academic prose.  
 
Research writing often involves times of inertial and discouragement. I believe these 
can be addressed with the help of a perspective which treats them, not as unfortunate 
detours, but as a natural part of the learning process, as the following paragraphs will 
explain.  
 
Energy level and engagement in learning. The point that there is significant 
physiological arousal with insight may allow deeper understanding of the place 
played by motivation in learning and research, especially in prolonged and often 
solitary processes such as doctoral research. I noted in an earlier research report 
(Hanrahan, 1998) that energy levels and engagement in learning seemed to be closely 
related to teacher support for autonomy in learning and to learning beliefs which 
value the personal role of students in their own learning. Perhaps, doctoral students 
could also be helped to enjoy more of the pleasure and surge in energy levels which 
come from developing personal insights, if there was less concern that they conform 
to impersonal forms of research and writing. Similarly, Nocerino (1991) commented 
on the joy to be had by action researching teachers when they achieved insights into 
personally challenging pedagogical situations, and seemed to suggest that such 
teachers found this rewarding enough to keep them motivated to continue to reflect on 
their practice..  
 
Opening impasses. Thinking of analysis in new ways may also be helpful for 
addressing a perennial problem encountered by researchers: overcoming writing 
blocks. It is possible that writing blocks may be caused by invisible barriers to 
progress in analysing a situation, and hence may be removed by exploring ways to 
surface such barriers, which may include emotional barriers and unexplored 
assumptions. If educational problems are seen as ill-structured problems and hence 
not easily solvable by simple analytic processes--as they might be if all the limits of a 
problem and its definition were clear (cf. Robinson, 1983)--then recognition that tacit 
knowledge may be missing from an analysis might allow new reframing of problems 
which could allow impasses to be opened up.  
 
The Functions of Language 
Language and its multiple functions become a very important focus in research based 
on an ecosocial system approach both because of its origin in the development of an 
ecosocial system and its integral place in practice. This has implications both for the 
practicality and rate of change likely to result in and from research. When language is 
seen only as communicating content, the complex role it plays in practice is not likely 
to be understood, which may lead to unrealistic goals for change. Because any change 
in the communication systems involved will require adaptation in all associated parts 
of the ecosocial system, any change is not likely to be an easy or rapid process. 
However such change might be facilitated by a recognition that language has multiple 
functions, and as well as presenting ideas and accomplishing activities, it is also about 
negotiating or maintaining interpersonal relationships (and power structures) and 
framing and maintaining organisational structures (cf. Carr & Kemmis, 1986; Lemke, 
1995).  
 
Quite apart from the place language often plays in maintaining the status quo or, 
alternatively, facilitating change, in systems which are the subject of research, the 
question of maintaining unproductive relationships and structures can also apply to 
research paradigms. For those who are well-socialised to a particular paradigm to the 
extent that they are oblivious to its special linguistic features, a text belonging to the 
discourse of that domain seems to have only an ideational function--to be concerned 
with communicating content. The other features, because they are more or less 
automatic, will not be noticed (except where they are absent or where implicit rules 
about them have been transgressed). This has the advantage that it allows for easy and 
quick communication--the assumptions underlying the domain do not need to be re-
explained at every juncture. However, this also allows a considerable part of 
knowledge to remain implicit and hence forgotten and not open to re-examination, 
and this is a disadvantage when the system is becoming less well adapted to achieving 
its educational goals. A system whose language practice allows it to reflect on its own 
assumptions and long-term goals, and to critique its own taken-for-granted methods is 
likely to more successful in the long run.  
 
Creativity 
Finally, given the literature on insight, it seems likely that thought processes which 
are normally below conscious control are critical to creativity in research. In my own 
research while completing my PhD, I have found that paying attention to my 
intuitions and feelings during my informal writing has greatly improved my insight 
into my tacit knowledge and assumptions, and has helped me find creative solutions 
to apparent impasses. Part of this process involved fluctuations in emotions and 




In this paper I have used theories from a range of perspectives to make the point that 
knowledge and practice involve many processes outside normal consciousness and 
control, processes which are an individual's adaptive response to the systems to which 
he/she/it belongs, and hence involve tacit beliefs and assumptions. Such theories 
provide an explanation of the barriers to and possibilities for change, and suggests that 
if human beings want to live in overall harmony with their social and material 
environment, then they need to examine and understand their taken-for-granted 
relations with other systems and to find ways to keep their own systems open to 
change. Research methods which allow for subconscious ways of knowing would 
seem to be better equipped to deal with the full complexity of the ecosocial systems in 
which they operate.  
 
Omitting mention of methods which deal with personal experience and relationships 
when writing reports of research would seem to imply that research is a technical 
matter only and to foster research which operates only on a technical level. I believe, 
therefore, that a-logical processes such as those discussed in this paper have a 
legitimate place in both research and research reports and that expectations about 
research writing should change to accommodate such beliefs. The success of 
mainstream research ventures may depend to a large extent on a change in the culture 
of research from one which largely sees objective (conscious, impersonal and 
systematic) thinking as the only valid means of accessing knowledge and which acts 
as though change in practice can by achieved using only conscious, logical processes.  
 
 
